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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
AUSTIN F. WINCHESTER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
EGAN FARM SERVICE, INC.,
Defendant and Respondent.

I

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Defendant deems it advisable and desirable to
supplement the Statement of Facts as set forth in Plaintiff's brief. To the extent that it is repetitious of
plaintiff's statement, it is to the end of coordinating the
facts.
Plaintiff commenced its action against Long Manufacturing Company and Dearborn Motors Corporation,·
as well as the defendant. Long Manufacturing Company
and its successor, Dearborn Motors, was alleged by
plaintiff as being the manufacturer of the baler. Defendant Egan was alleged to have "assembled or attached the part of the baler which caused the injury".
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The complaint further alleged that plaintiff was struck
in the face "by a lever, which, without fault of the plaintiff, broke loose from its mounting". __ The complaint
then alleged :
"4. Said lever and mounting was negligently
and carelessly attached to the aforesaid baler,
was negligently, poorly and improperly engineered and constructed, and contained attachment
parts which were weak, defective and insufficient
in size and strength, all to the degree that the
same was unsafe and constituted a menace to
human life and limb. Defendants knew, or should
have known, that the same was dangerous and
defective for the purpose of its intended use."
Service of process was attempted to be made on
the defendants, Long Manufacturing Company and
Dearborn :Motors, but such service was quashed on
motion of such defendants. Plaintiff elected to ·proceed
against the defendant Egan, which was neither the
engineer, designer nor manufacturer, and who was in
no wise responsible for the design or construction of
the baler, nor any of its component parts, including the
lever assembly.
Plaintiff called as his first witness .A. Merlin Egan,
President and Manager of the defendant company. He
testified that he received the baler in question from his
distributor. That when so received the lever proper was
not attached to the ba~er, but that the attaching parts,
namely, the bolt, nut, washer and spacer, were attached.
Thus, in attaching the lever, all he had to do was to
remove the nut and washer from the bolt (which was
already in the frame) slip the lever on, replace the
washer and tighten the nut. He used no parts of his
2
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own, and all parts to be used came attached to the frame
(T1·. 14-21). lie further testified that the machine as
so assembled was delivered to plaintiff a few days prior
to Septmnbo1· 18, 1931, and that plaintiff, after trying
the machine out for a few days, bought it on September
18, 1951.
We here interject to recall to the Court that the
contention of plaintiff is that the defendant, Egan Farm
Service, Inc., negligently and improperly attached the
lever assembly by (1) using an undersized bolt, and,
(2) completely omitting the sleeve or spacer. Neither
of these contentions were proven by the testimony of
Mr. Egan, but on the contrary his testimony established(1) that he used the parts furnished by the manufacturer, and none other, and (2) the sleeve or spacer was
included in the attachment of the lever, and was on the
machine at the time of delivery.
We return now to the facts as established by the
testimony.
Plaintiff's next witness was Kerry Olsen, a farmer,
from near Eden, Utah, and himself the owner of a baler
of the type in question which he, too, purchased in 1951
(Tr. 23). He identified E;xhibits A, B and C as parts
coming from his baler. The exhibits were received in
evidence for illustrative purposes. On cross-'examination, he testified that during normal operations parts
of the machine became loosened, and it is necessary from
time to time to go over the machine and tighten them
up (Tr. 24), or replace them (Tr. 27).
3
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Plaintiff's next witness was plaintiff himself and
it is necessary that his testimony be detailed. He testified on direct examination that he did custom work with
hay baling equipment, tractors, and carry-alls, and that
all of his time was spent working with farm and industrial equipment (Tr. 28). He bought the baler in
September, 1951, used it to bale some 1300 bales of hay
that fall, stored it through the winter, and had used it
for some two weeks the next spring prior to the accident
(Tr. 29-30). He demonstrated to the Court and jury
the position of the lever while baling, namely, that when
in the depressed position the end of it was at his right
hip as he sat on the tractor seat, and that when released
it moved upward and backward (Tr. 31-32). On the
day in question he had completed baling one section of
the field, had depressed the lever to take the baler out
of operation, and moved to another section to bale some
more. With the lever in this depressed position at his
right hip, he turned on his seat to the right, brought his
face over the lever, reached for the handle to release it,
but before he touched it the lever released itself and the
spring tension caused it to fly up and strike him in the
face (Tr. 31-32). The handle struck him across the
bridge of the nose, and the extreme end of the handle
pierced his right eye (Tr. 33) (we emphasize this point
particularly for reasons that will presently appear).
After testifying as to the nature and extent of his
injuries, he testified that about two weeks after the
accident he removed the lever from the baler, and removed the bolt, Exhibit E, (which when received in evidence was but part of a bolt), and that there was no
sleeve. In explaining why Exhibit E was but part of
4
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a bolt, he said that in rmnoving it with wrenches he
twisted it in two, and the nut end fell into the grass and
he couldn't see \vell enough to find it (Tr. 45-46). He
also testified that there were washers on the bolt when
he removed it (Tr. 47), and at that time the lever had
some up and down play in it. He hadn't noticed it
before.
On cross-examination he testified that he had owned
balers before purchasing this one, but was in the market
for a new one. Others had told him that the Long 50
was a good baler, and he decided to buy one. He saw
this one at Egan's, and arranged for it to be sent to his
farm. He used it for two or three days and bought it
(Tr. 52-54), despite the fact that he had concluded from
his de1nonstration there were things wrong with itloose and defective parts (Tr. 58-59), although nothing
wrong with the lever assembly that he noticed. He did
nothing himself to correct the defects, not even to
tighten loose bolts he knew were loose, but used it in
that condition that fall, and the next spring up to the
time of the accident (Tr. 59-60). Prior to the accident
plaintiff called Egan's mechanic to come and fix a
broken part, and while the mechanic was there plaintiff
did not call his attention to other matters that plaintiff
knew needed fixing err. 61-63). Also that at the time
he bought the machine he knew the lever had too much
play in it (Tr. 66).
He further testified that the machine was not in
his possession continuously prior to the accident but
three other fellows had it and used it at different times
(Tr. 66-67). Also that he never did like the lever assembly, and had discussed with an Egan representative a
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change in its design, because, as it \Yas, he was running
into it every time he walked between the tractor and
the baler (Tr. 68), and that it was in the way in getting
on and off the seat (Tr. 71).
He was then brought back to the occasion of his
removal of the bolt, Exhibit E,, shortly after the accident.
In this connection, he testified that in addition to the
nut and bolt, there were two washers on the nut end
of the bolt, and that in attempting to loosen the nut,
he twisted the bolt in two. The two washers, as well
as the nut end of the bolt dropped in the grass, and he
couldn't find them because he "couldn't see too good"he still had his eye bandaged, and the other eye was
inflamed (Tr. 75 ).
In his further description of how the accident happened, he reiterated that the lever was at his right hip
in a depressed position, that leaning to his right he had
brought his face over the lever, and was looking downward, when it released, the handle striking his nose,
and the extreme end of the handle punctured his eye
(Tr. 86-88). He denied that he was in the process of
climbing on the tractor from the right when the accident
happened (Tr. 86), but acknowledged, following a
demonstration, that if he was he would then be in a
position for the lever to strike across the bridge of his
nose and the end to pierce his right eye (Tr. 89.}
Next followed a demonstration in which plaintiff
participated, and which disclosed that with the lever
assembled without the bushing ( s01netimes referred to
as the sleeve or spacer-Exhibit B) the lever wouldn't
6
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work at all (Tr. 89-93). At this he acknowledged that
perhaps the bushing had been there, but had become
broken during the course of the baler's use (Tr. 9·3). ,
On redirect examination he sought to demonstrate
that a spot of weld on the frame prevented the lever
from working in the previous demonstration made without the bushing, and showed how by using some half
dozen additional washers (which he previously had
testified were not on his n1achine), and a loose nut on
the bolt, the lever could work without the bushing (Tr.
110). However, on recrossexamination, he cinched up
the nut (as he had previously testified that the nut
in question was cinched so tight he broke the bolt in
removing it) and when so tightened it was again demonstrated that with a tight nut and no bushing the lever
couldn't be operated at all (Tr. 111-112).
The further testimony consisted of that of Max
Robinson, who had used the baler but who couldn't
recall whether it was subsequent or prior to the accident,
and who testified that he had not adjusted any bolts
or worked on the lever assembly (rrr. 113-114). Also
the testimony of Evan Stark, who had used the baler,
prior to the accident and who did not add, tighten or
remove any bolts from the lever assembly. Dick Spurlock, the third man who used the baler, was not called
as a witness, but one George Combe and one Bud Combe
testified that during the time Spurlock was using the
baler at their place they never saw him work on the
lever assembly, or otherwise tighten or adjust any
bolts. (Tr. 116-121).
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We are mindful that the foregoing detail of the
evidence has been somewhat lengthy, but we have
deemed it essential that this Court be fully advised of
the evidence before the lower Court, and on which it
based the ruling from which this appeal is made.

II.
POINTS RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF AND
CONTROVERTED BY DEFENDANT.
In seeking a reversal of the lower Court's order for
a directed verdict in favor of defendant, plaintiff raises
the following points:
(A) The evidence tended to prove negligence on
the part of defendant in assen~bling the baler,
(B) The evidence did not prove as a matter of
law that the accident was caused by plaintiff'~ negligence, nor that plaintiff's negligence contributed thereto,
(C) The evidence did not prove as a matter of
law that plaintiff assumed the risk of his
injuries.
In this connection plaintiff assigns to the lower
Court the latter ground as the basis for the lower Court's
ruling. In so doing plaintiff is acting purely gratuitously, as there is nothing in the record to so indicate.
True it is that prior to making its ruling, the Court required, and listened intently to, extensive argument by
respective counsel on each of the points, but there is
and was nothing to indicate that its ruling was based
on any one of the~e points, to the exclusion of the others.
Actually the matter is of little consequence, because,
8
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regardless of what may or may not have been par..;
ticularly pursuasive to thelower Court, the ruling should
be sustained if right for any reason.
We will now consider the several points raised by
plaintiff.
III.
ARGUMENT
A.

THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO ESTABLISH
ANY NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT IN ASSEMBLING THE BALER
PROXIMATELY CAUSING PLAINTIFF'S INJURIEB.
In considering this phase of the case, it is impor..
tant to bear in mind that both in the lower Court, and
in his brief herein, plaintiff has contended that defendant's negligence consisted of two acts:
( 1) Omitting to insert the bushing (sometimes referred to as the sleeve or spacer) in attaching the lever,
and
(2) Using a 3j8" bolt, instead of a 1/2" bolt in
attaching the lever.
In discussing this point of argument plaintiff inaccurately, as we believe, refers to defendant's actions
in preparing the baler for delivery as "assembling the
baler".
Actually, the baler came completely assembled except for the attchment of the lever. To the extent that
9
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the act of so attaching the lever can be described as
assembling it, defendant admittedly did so, but only
to that extent.
It is also necessary to bear in mind that proof of
negligence on the part of defendant, standing alone,
is not sufficient. The proof must also show that such
negligence proximately caused plaintiff's injuries. Our
views on both points will now be presented.
First, the question of defendant's asserted negligence. All of the affirmative evidence on the point must
come from the testimony of Mr. Egan, and the plaintiff,
because no one else testified in regard thereto. Mr.
Egan's testimony established that when he received the
baler from the distributor, the lever was detached and
separately wrapped, but that the bolt, washers, spacer
and nut were attached to the baler, and all that was
necessary for him to do was to remove these parts from
the frame, insert the lever, and fasten it with these same
bolt, spacer, washers and nut, and this was done. He
used no parts of his own-used only the parts supplied
him by the distributor-and all of them.
Thus his testimony established as a part of plaintiff's own case, that the bushing in question was inserted in the attaching process. True it is, that he was
the President and General Manager of defendant Company, and hence plaintiff may not be bound by his
testimony in the strict sense of the word, but his testimony is, nevertheless, competent evidence of the fact,
and, except as it may have been contradicted by subsequent witnesses, constitutes the only evidence upon
the subject. Now, where is there anything to contradict
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his testimony that the bushing was not omitted in the
attaching process 1 We look to the testimony of the
plaintiff himself, as he was the only witness other than
Mr. Egan who testified on the subject. His testimony
was that some two weeks after the accident, (approximately nine months after the purchase of the machine~
and after the machine had been out of his possession
and into the possession of at least three other individuals, he disassembled the lever, and no bushing was
then present. Actually all he had of the attaching parts
at the time of trial was the head end of a broken bolt,
the other parts having been lost in the grass at the time
of his taking it apart. He did not contradict Mr. Egan
in that the bushing was there at the time of delivery,
but on the contrary conceded that it could have become
broken and fallen out during his operation of the baler
during the several months preceding the accident.
Further than that, his categorical assertion that the
bushing was not present when he detached the lever
loses much of its force in the light of his testimony
that at the time he couldn't see well, his one eye was
bandaged and the other inflamed, and that he actuall)'
lost in the grass all of the parts that were present
except the head end of the broken bolt.
Further than that, it was conclusively established
that the lever assembly operated satisfactorily at all
times prior to the accident, and gave the plaintiff no
trouble whatsoever; and that without the bushing, and
with the nut cinched tight (and it was so tight plaintiff
twisted the bolt in two in attempting to loosen the nut),
the lever wouldn't operate at all.

11
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Thus, on the point of whether defendant omitted
the bushing at the time of attaching the lever, and before delivery of the baler to plaintiff, we have the
following:
(1) Egan's positive testimony that it was not omitted,
(2) The lever operated satisfactorily during the
several weeks the bailer was in operation prior to the
accident,
( 3) Without the bushing the lever bound against
the frame and would not operate at all, so it must have
been present,
( 4) Plaintiff's admission that it might have become
broken and fallen out,
(5) Plaintiff's admission that he couldn't see well
at the time he detached the lever, and
(6) Plaintiff's admission that he lost in the grass
at the time of removal all of the attaching parts that
were pres·ent, except the head end of the bolt.
, We submit, accordingly, that there was no evidence
whatever that defendant omitted the bushing, and that
the evidence as well as all inferences that can be drawn
therefrom, are all to the contrary.
Now, as to the contention that an undersized bolt
was used by defendant in attaching the lever.
On this point the evidence disclosed that the opening through the bushing was large enough to acconunodate a lj2" bolt, but that a 3/8" bolt was used. In the
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first place, in characterizing it as undersized, we use
only counsel's descriptive phraseology. True it is that
it was an eighth of an inch smaller than the opening
in the bushing through which it passed, but it must be
remembered that the bushing was designed to turn on
the bolt, and thus the bolt of necessity had to be smaller.
Further than that, it is the bolt that was supplied by
the manufacturer for this purpose, and it must be
assumed, absent some pretty potent evidence to the
contrary, that the manufacturer provided a bolt that
was right and proper. Here it will be recalled that
the manufacturer was named a defendant, and was
charged with improperly designing and engineering the
baler, but the action has not been pursued against him,
and there is no evidence in this case to support those
allegations. Certainly on the record as it now stands,
the defendant cannot be charged with liability for using
the precise part that was designed and supplied by the
manufacturer for that particular purpose.
Finally, assuming a larger bolt could have been
used, there is no evidence that the smaller bolt produced
or contributed to the injury. The baler was in operation for many weeks prior to the accident, and the
plaintiff, as well as the others who had used it, testified
that the lever had never slipped out before. It is inconceivable that if it was the small bolt that caused it
to slip out on this occasion, the same slipping would have
occurred at least once during the long periods of operation prior to the accident. To say that the three-eights
inch bolt caused the accident, as distinguished from
any one of a dozen other causes, is purely speculation.
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In support of his contention that defendant was
negligent in using this particular bolt, despite the fact
it was the one supplied by the manufacturer for this
particular purpose, plaintiff cites and relies on two
recent decisions of this court. Hooper v. General
Motors Corp. (Utah 1953) 260 P. (2) 549, and Northern
v. General Motors Corporation (Utah 1954) 268 P. (2)
981. Each of those cases involved suits against the
manufacturer of the vehicle involved, as distinguished
from a suit against a dealer, as in the instant case. In
each case there was affirmative evidence of a defect
in materials used, which, as the court pointed out in
the Northern case, is something which "in this day of
X-ray and other elaborate methods of testing steel"
was reasonably discoverable by a manufacturer or assembler such as General Motors.
The duty to reasonably inspect is, of course, the
measure of a vendor's responsibility to the purchaser of
a manufactured article, but what is reasonable for the
manufacturer, may well be unreasonable for a mere
vendor. The Northern case presents an apt example.
It may well be that a manufacturer or assembler such
as General Motors has the duty, through technical
processes available to it, to discover defects in steel
that go into the finished product, but it would be highly
unreasonable to impose the same responsibility on the
retailer. Likewise, the designer and manufacturer of
the hay baler here involved might well be charged with
knowledge that the use of the particular bolt might
present a hazard, but how can Egan, who is neither
designer, engineer nor manufacturer, be charged with
that knowledge. The most he can do is to inspect and
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test. By inspection he is aware that the bolt in question
is the one reconnnended by the manufacturer for the
particular purpose, and to all outward appearances fits
the purpose. By testing he can ascertain to some degree its suitability, but the extent of the testing must
be reasonable. In the instant case the lever assembly
worked satisfactorily during five weeks of continuous
field operation of the baler-two weeks in the fall
and three weeks the following spring. Plaintiff, who
himself operated the baler during the greater portion
of this period, testified that at no time pr;ior to the
accident did it operate other than satisfactorily. In
other words, Egan could have field tested this machine
for up to five weeks without discovering that the bolt
was unsatisfactory. We submit that the doctrine of
reasonable inspection does not impose this responsibility
on a dealer such as Egan. If it did, a vendor of farm
machinery could never sell a new machine, but of
necessity would be required to virtually wear it out in
tests, unless he was willing to assume the risk of a
defect in design or manufacture.
We have, for the purposes of demonstrating the
particular point, assumed during the past several paragraphs of this brief, that the bolt was in fact undersized
and thus constituted a defect in the machine. We submit, however, that there is no evidence in the record
to support this assu1nption. To reach this assumption
plaintiff relies upon an answer given by Mr. Egan,
"It wouldn't be right", to a question propounded him
by plaintiff's counsel, and informs this court (page 11
of plaintiff's brief) that by the answer Egan admitted
that the use of such bolt would constitute negligence.

15
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We deny both the fact and the inference. The question
that was propounded, and the answer, are as follows
(Tr. 12):

"Q But, getting back to my exact question,
if someone put a 3j8 bolt through a half inch
bushing, as this appears to be, wouldn't you say
that that was improperly assembled~
"A. That wouldn't be right."
Plaintiff pursued the matter no further, being content with this somewhat ambiguous answer. What
"wouldn't be right"~ Obviously what Egan is saying is
that the assumption plaintiff's counsel indulged in framing the question, namely, that such use constituted improper assembly, wasn't right. Certainly it is a far
cry from any admission on his part that the use of the
bolt in question wasn't right, much less negligence.
Plaintiff also complains (page 12 of his brief) that
had the trial progressed in its "logical order" he would
"have brought out evidence that Egan Farm
Service, Inc., improperly assembled the lever
mechanism on nearly every long "50" baler which
it sold and assembled to the minimum point of
showing that 3/8 inch bolts were inserted into
1j2 inch bushin.gs (Tr. 12, 22, 24); and that this
defect could have been remedied by drilling the
baler chamber to 1j2 inch in size and inserting a
1j2 inch bolt."
What he means by had "the trial progressed in its
logical order" he would have brought out this evidence,
we are at a loss to understand. The trial proceeded to
a point where he rested, and, if in resting, he deprived
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himself of the opportunity of offering additional evidence, he alone is to blame. Further than that, the
significance of this additional evidence from plaintiff's
standpoint is not apparent. What he is suggesting is
that this same so-called "undersized bolt" was used by
Egan in all of the Long 50 balers he sold. But plaintiff
doesn't claim that any other purchaser had any trouble
as a result thereof, which reacts against his contention
that the bolt was responsible for his difficulty. Actually,
plaintiff was induced in part to buy a Long 50 upon the
recommendation of other owners (Tr. 52), and if their
balers had the same type bolt, it would be but further
evidence that the same was both proper and suitable.
Further than that, plaintiff would have proved
that "the defect could have been remedied by drilling
the baler chamber to lj2 inch in size and inserting a
1/2 inch bolt." In other words, to cure the "defect"
defendant would have had to enlarge the baler chamber
to accommodate a larger bolt. This but emphasizes
what we have been arguing, namely, that the dostrine of
reasonable care does not impose upon a dealer in nationally advertised and widely used farm machinery the
duty of redesigning and rebuilding machines supplied
him by the manufacturer before he can safely offer them
to his customers.

B.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED AND
CONTRIBUTED TO BY HIS OWN NEGLIGE1NCE.
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Assuming for this phase of the argument that
negligence on the part of the defendant was present,
we contend that plaintiff was himself negligent, and
such negligence proximately caused, or contributed to
his injuries. We make this contention by reason of
plaintiff's own testimony that he (1) knew of the hazard presented by the lever while in the depressed condition under spring tension, (2) that it was unnecessary
for him to bring his face over the lever in order to
release it, and (3) that he needlessly exposed himself to
this danger. We quote from his testimony on this point
( Tr. 83-85) :

"Q Now assuming that the chair upon which
you are now sitting is the tractor seat, can you
indicate for the benefit of the Court and the
jury approximately where the handle of the lever
would be?
"A Well, you could reach the handle of the
lever back with your right hand from the tractor
seat.

"Q Now you are indicating a point immediately opposite your right hip, are you not?
"A That's right.

"Q As you sit there
"A That's right.
"Q And approximately how far distant from
your hip?
"A Well, there is about 18 inches of space
between the tractor seat and the fender, and the
lever would center in this position. (Indicating)

"Q So the lever would be approximately 9
inches from your hip, you think 1
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"A That would be about right.

"Q And up even with your hip¥
"A Somewhere close.

"Q Now you further testified that you had
had occasion to set and release that lever many
times in the past?
"A Every time I took the machine out of
operation.

"Q In fact you had set the lever in that
position just a few minutes before the injury
had occurred, had you not¥
"A That's right.

"Q The lever, in this set or depressed position, is pulling against the tension of a spring
to which it is attached, is it not¥

"A It is.
"Q And you knew that at that time¥
"A Yes.

"Q And you knew by reason of that tension,
that upon its being released it releases with considerable force¥

"A Yes.
"Q Now at this particular moment, as I recall your testimony, you were just getting ready
to release the lever to commence baling this
second section~
"A I had pulled in and stopped, and was
getting ready to start on this next field of hay.

"Q And I believe you testified that you were
just in the act of reaching for the lever 1
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"A For some reason I turned around on the
seat of the tractor.
"Q I realize that, but didn't you say you
were just getting ready to release the lever~
"A I was in the process of beginning to bale.

"Q Let's see if we can be a little more definite than that. Didn't you say that you were
just reaching for the lever at the time it released
unexpectedly upon you~
"A I may have said that.

"Q This was in the

afternoon~

"A Yes. I think it was right after lunch.

"Q You could see well at that time, could
you

not~

"A Yes.

"Q Was there anything that distracted your
attention at that particular moment from what
you were doing~
"A Nothing that I know of, other than getting ready to start on the field.

"Q Now the lever, in the position that it was
in, could be released without your bringing your
face over it, could it not~
"A Yes, it could be released.

"Q But nevertheless, as I understand it, you
did bring your face over the lever~
me.

"A Well, I was in a position for it to strike
That's true.

"Q And in that position you had brought
your face over the lever~
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"A That's right.

"Q And the lever, upon being released, came
up and hit you in the face~
"A That's right.
Plaintiff, however, argues that contributory negligence is applicable only where the party has exposed
himself to the particular risk from which he suffers
harm, and that in the instant case the particular risk
was not the lever held under spring tension, but the
allegedly defective catch which held it in place. We
submit such is not the case. An analagous situation
existed in the case of Raymond v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
113 Utah 26, 191 P. (2) 137. In that case plaintiff,
who had had many years' experience in railroading,
was on the end of an open gondola car during switching operations, his hand grasping the top of the car
and his fingers on the inside. The car was loaded with
scrap metal, a portion of which shifted and crushed his
hand. He acknowledged that it was unnecessary for him
to have his hand inside the car, as there was an available
grab bar he could have been holding onto. The lower
court held him guilty of contributory negligence as a
matter of law, and this court affirmed. On this particular point the court observed:
"Notwithstanding his extensive railroad experience, and his cognizance of the dangers of
shifting loads he placed his hand in a position on
and inside the car in such a manner that a slight
forward shifting of the load could and did injure
it.
"On cross-examination plaintiff testified as
follows:
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" 'Q. You knew it was extremely dangerous
to put your hand in such a position on the top
of that gondola; you knew that it was dangerous
to, and unsafe thing to do, didn't you, Mr. Raymond, to place your hand on the end of that
gondola so that * * * A. Yes.
" 'Q. If some of the load shifted you might
get injured; you knew that~ A. I wasn't expecting the load to shift.
" 'Q. Of course not. You wouldn't deliberately put your hand there~ A. No.

"'Q. But you knew it was dangerous to put
any part of your body inside of a loaded gondola
when it is in movement, didn't you? A. It is.
"On redirect examination plaintiff was led
by his counsel into stating that what he meant
by his testimony on cross-examination was that
it was unsafe under the circumstances to put his
hand inside the car, but that if the load had been
tied down securely, it would not have been unsafe.
The explanation offered by plaintiff on redirect
examination can hardly be regarded as a satisfactory explanation of his cross-examination.

" * * * *
"The obvious truth, from plaintiff's own
testimony, is that he gave no thought to his own
safety. He placed his hand in a position which
he knew to be dangerous, when there was a safe
method open to him. The court below correctly
held that plaintiff was guilty of contributory
negligence as a matter of law."
The same is true here. Plaintiff had no thought
of his own saftey. He placed his face in a position he
knew to be dangerous, when there was a safe method
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open to hi1n. We submit that under the circumstances
the plaintiff herein, like the plaintiff in the case just
cited, was himself, by his own testimony, negligent as
a matter .of law.

c.
THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHED AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF ASSUMED
THE RISK OF HIS INJURIES.
Here again we assume for the purpose of the argument that defendant was negligent, but urge that even
upon that assumption the plaintiff cannot recover for
the reason that he assumed the risk of his injuries. Two
comparatively recent cases involving the doctrine of
assumed risk as it is applied in this jurisdiction are
Clay v. Dunford (Utah) 1952, 239 P. (2) 1075, and Wold
v. Ogden City (Utah, 1953), 258 P. (2) 453.
The Clay case involved a situation where the plaintiff stepped from his parked station wagon into the
path of a moving vehicle. The doctrine was held not
there applicable because at the time plaintiff was struck
he was
"standing on the shoulder of the highway where
vehicles ordinarily do not travel, with his back
turned toward the oncoming truck, completely
negativing knowledge or appreciation of the
specific danger, and negativing any intention
voluntarily to expose himself to a known danger,

* * * "
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Wolfe pointed
out that ·for the doctrine to be applicable it must be
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shown that there is: (1) a palpably dang~rous condition;
(2) knowledge and appreciation of the danger; and (3)
a voluntary act by plaintiff showing that he was willing
to take the chance.
We submit that each condition was present in the
instant case. The depressed lever held under spring
tension constituted a palpably dangerous condition;
plaintiff acknowledged that he was aware of the danger
-but din't think the catch would let go; he voluntarily
and deliberately exposed himself to the danger, admitting that it was unnecessary for him to do so. The
fact he didnt think the catch would let go does not obviate
his awareness of the danger. The situation is analogous
to the workman who put his hand in the open gondola
car (Raymond v. Union Pacific, supra) "not expecting
the load to shift". Or like an individual who knowingly
and deliberately looks into the muzzle of a gun he knows
to be loaded and on cock. Certainly he doesn't expect
that the catch which holds the gun on cock is defective,
or that it will slip and permit the gun to discharge, but
when he knowingly and needlessly brings any part o±'
his body into range under those circumstances he assumes the risk of any consequences, as well as being
contributorily negligent.
True it is that a piece of farm machinery such as
this is not an instrument inherently dangerous in and of
itself, but there are moving parts thereof, gears and
pulleys as well as spring tension levers, which present a
hazard. Likewise, the engine on the baler being in
operation, a vibration is created which will have a
tendency to dislodge the catch on a spring tension lever
where the same is not firmly set, or where the locking
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parts have become worn through usage. These are facts
which are well knov.m to any reasonably prudent man,
more especially to one who has worked about farm
machinery generally to the extent plaintiff had. Thus,
we submit that the plaintiff, being fully aware of the
potential danger, but nevertheless deliberately and needlessly exposing himself thereto, brought himself within
the doctrine of assu1ned risk.
We have also 1nentioned the case of Wold v. Ogden
This case involved an open trench extending along the Northerly side of 18th Street, between
Washington and Grant Avenues, in Ogden City. Plaintiff resided on the North side of 18th Street, about midway of the block. Plaintiff was aware of the open
trench. About 2 :30 A.M., he was returning home with
his wife "looked the situation over", "decided he could
safely cross", straddled the ditch to assist his wife
across, and fell into the trench when one of the banks
gave way under his foot. There were no crossings over
the trench, and persons living on the North side of 18th
Street either had to jump the trench, or go to Grant
Avenue or Washington Avenue and cross in the street.
This Court held:

City, supra.

"Under such facts we believe plaintiff was contributorily negligent and also assumed a known
risk precluding recovery as a matter of law,
denying no constitutional right to a jury trial."

1entl

l~~
~v~i

~~~

~

Those facts are analogous to those in the instant
case. In each case the plaintiff was aware of the hazard
-the open ditch in the Wold case, and the lever under
spring tension in this case. In each case a safe way
25
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of proceeding was provided-by going around the trench
in the Wold case, and by operating the lever without
exposing his head to its line of travel in this case. In
neither case did the plaintiff forsee the specific occurrence which resulted in his injuries-the bank giving
way in the Wold case, or the catch giving way in this
case. This Court held he was contributorily negligent
and assumed the risk in the Wold case. We respectfully
submit that the same conclusion must of necessity follow
here. As pointed out in the Wold case:
"the doctrine of assumption of risk, originally
applicable to employer-en1ployee relations, has
been extended to some situations where one knows
of a condition and concludes to accept its attendant hazards and acts accordingly without force
of necessity."
CONCLUSION.
Defendant submits that the lower court had a duty
as a matter of law, under the evidence as it stood at
the conclusion of plaintiffs case, to direct a verdict in
favor of the defendant, upon each of the grounds assigned, namely, (1) no negligence shown on the part
of the defendant; (2) contributory negligence on the
part of plaintiff; and ( 3) assumption of risk on the
part of plaintiff.
In regard to defendant's negligence, which plaintiff
contends consisted of (1) omitting the bushing, and (2)
using an undersized bolt, the evidence consisted of:
.A.

AS TO THE BUSHNG.
26
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1. Egan's positive testimony that it was not
omitted, which testimony was not contradicted, directly, indirectly or inferentially,
2. The lever operated satisfactorily during the
several weeks of operation prior to the
accident,
3. Without the bushing and with the bolt
cinched tight (as it admittedly was) the lever
wouldn't operate at all,
4. Plaintiff's concession that it might have become broken and fallen out,
5. Plaintiff's admission that he couldn't see
well at the tin1e he detached the lever, and,
6. Plaintiff's admission that he lost in the grass
all of the attaching parts that were present
except the head end of the bolt.
Thus, under the evidence on this point there was
not even a scintilla of evidence that the bushing had
been omitted by Egan-nothing whatever that could
support a finding by the jury that it had been omitted.

B.

AS TO THE BOLT.
1. There was no evidence whatever that the

bolt was undersized, except in the sense that
it was of slightly less diameter than the
bushing through which it passed, whic;h is
normal.
2. It was the bolt that was supplied by the
manufacturer for this particular purpose.
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3. There was no evidence whatever that the
size of the bolt proximately caused the catch
to give way, and it would be pure speculation
to say that such was the cause.
We submit that the status of the evidence as above
referred to upon the question of the defendant's negligence supports as a matter of law the ruling of the
lower court granting a directed verdict, without regard
to the questions of contributory negligence or assumption of risk. Notwithstanding that, however, plaintiff's
own evidence established as a matter of law that he was
guilty of contributory negligence in needlessly exposing
himself to the hazards of the known danger, and that
in so doing he assurned the risk of the resulting consequences.
Respectfully submitted,
HOWELL~,

STINE AND OLMSTEAD
RICHARD W. BRANN
Attorneys for defendant and
respondent.
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